But this possibility could not be avoided; This happened when the Germans finally responded to the creditors` demand for average pensions of more than 2,200 million over a period of fifty-eight years, with their own proposal of 1,650 million on average over thirty-seven years and on countless conditions. This seemed to mean the failure of the conference. Even Mr Young`s compromise proposal, which set the average pension for this young plan at 2 billion in round figures, was not in itself calculated to simplify the conflict of the parties, because it was no more based on economic knowledge than the creditors` debt or the German offer. This proposal finally made it very clear that in Paris it was not a question of recognition of economic opportunities, but of a purely political agreement. In this regard, the German delegates would have had sufficient reason to hand over their resignations to the German government. Only one of the experts, industry representative Dr. Vogler, came to this conclusion at the last minute. The other three delegates were authorized by the German government to recognize the existing conditions and to agree with creditors on the basis of Owen D. Young`s proposal. The interruption of the conference would have caused a crisis of incalculable consequences, the beginning of which was already triggered by panic on the German stock markets and in the threatening vibrations of the Reichsmark. Although the Young Plan did reduce Germany`s commitments, it was rejected by some parts of the German political spectrum. Conservative groups had most strongly opposed reparations and had approached resistance to the young plan as a theme.
Under the leadership of Alfred Hugenberg, the leader of the German National People`s Party, a coalition of different conservative groups was formed. One of the groups that joined the coalition was Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Party of German Workers. The plan included, among other things, an international resolution bank to make repair transfers.